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The Unique Role of Logic in the 
Development of Heidegger's 
Dialogue with Kant 
F R A N K  S C H A L O W  
IN K A N T  A N D THE P R O B L E M  OF METAPHYSI CS ,  Heidegger maintains that the c r u x  
of  his radical reinterpretation of transcendental philosophy centers on re- 
vamping Kant's most decisive innovation, the Copernican Revolution in phi- 
losophy. According to Heidegger, Kant's attempt to shift the focus of meta- 
physics from a concern for the nature of  the object to the finite conditions that 
make possible our relation to it amounts to showing that any comportment 
toward beings presupposes the preunderstanding of  being. 1 It is precisely the 
simplicity of  Heidegger's first step in the Kant book that I wish to call into 
question. Specifically, I intend to argue that Heidegger does not merely substi- 
tute his own emphasis on the question of  being for Kant's critical endeavor to 
circumscribe the boundaries of reason. Rather, I will show that Heidegger 
approaches transcendental philosophy as providing a further inroad into the 
attempt to unfold the roots of our basic patterns of  thought, and thereby as 
suggesting a topography to chart the deeper unity of logic and ontology which 
had become noticeably separated in modern philosophy. 
Heidegger's attempt in the Kant book to uncover the origin of  truth in 
Dasein's finite transcendence can be appreciated only by showing its prefig- 
urement in his earlier lectures, which begin to uproot the priority of the 
assertion as the definitive locus of truth. The breakthrough that Heidegger 
accomplishes in the Kant book is not an isolated event; it instead presupposes 
Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe 3 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
KIostermann, 1951), 13, 15--16; Kant i~nd the Problem of Metaphysics, tr. Richard Taft (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 199o), 8, lo. Hereafter, all references to the Gesamtamgabe will include the 
abbreviation GA followed by the volume number, German pagination, and the corresponding page 
number in the English translation (i.e., tr.), where applicable. 
[los] 
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a move in which he redefines knowledge in terms of  our  comportment  toward 
beings, and locates the site for determining meaning within the referential 
structure of  the worm rather than more narrowly within judgment .  The  over- 
turning of  the preeminence o f  the "as" of  assertion by the "hermeneutical  as" 
provides the key to the t ransformation of  logic which forms the cornerstone o f  
the Kant book. From the beginning of  his career Heidegger  had been familiar 
with Kant's writings, and had been influenced by the dominant  school of  
German philosophy at that time, neo-Kantianism.'  But it was not until he 
abrupdy changed the oudine o f  his lecture course Logik: Die Frage nachder 
Wo.hrheit, at the close o f  the winter semester of  ~995, that  he seized upon the 
brilliance o f  Kant's insight into the temporal formation of  the categories 
through schematism.s 
The  direction taken by these ~925-96 lectures becomes important  by first 
marking the differences between Heidegger's own task and Kant's. It is the 
gradual dissolution o f  these barriers which makes the emerging paral lels-- the 
key themes of  finitude, temporality, and t ranscendence--prove particularly 
compelling. Because o f  its detailed treatment of  these motifs, the Kant book has 
provided the paradigm for unders tanding Heidegger 's interpretation o f  tran- 
scendental philosophy. Few scholars have paused to consider why Heidegger  
should turn suddenly to Kant's doctrine of  schematism as providing an entirely 
new angle f rom which to formulate  the question of  being. To  be sure, we could 
continue to affirm the centrality o f  this doctrine due  to its temporal focus and  
thereby assume the plausibility o f  Heidegger's decision to vault Kant into the 
forefront  o f  his own ontological inquiry. Yet it might  be more rewarding in- 
stead to distinguish the gulf  initially separating the two thinkers, the very over- 
coming of  which creates the d/a/og/ca/space in which the provocative analyses 
comprising the Kant  book already move.~ Specifically, I wish to ask how 
Heidegger  can overcome the limited applicability of  schematism for determin- 
ing the orderliness o f  natural events, and redefine more broadly its temporal  
'Cs Heidegger's discussion of the neo-Kanfian Windelband's view of judgment in Zur 
BezZimraung der Philoso~, GA 56/57: 151ft. Much of Heidegger's early development centers 
around his exchange with the Marburg school of neo-Kantians, as seen most prominendy in the 
figure of Cohen, as well as the influence exerted by his teacher, Rickert. Much of Heidegger's 
effort to formulate his concept of logic springs from his concern with the neo-Kandan explana- 
tion of the formation of categories, although he was later to transpose it as an emphasis on 
existentials rather than categories of the present-at-hand. 
s Heidegger, Log/k." D/e Frage aac.h der Wahrheit, GA ~ I, Cf. Walter Biemers allusion in the 
Nac.huu~ to the Logik's providing the germ for the Kant book. Also see Theodore Kisiel, "Why the 
First Draft of Being and T/me Was Never Published," Journa/of the British Society for Phenomenolog~ 
so (January 1989): ~8-~o. 
( Cf. Frank Schalow, The Reneu~ of the Heidegger-Kant Dialogue: Action, Thought and Responsibil- 
(Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1992 ). 
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character in terms of  human understanding (Verstehen) in its interpreted, his- 
torical concreteness. Such a development, which may be said to have been 
pioneered by Dilthey toward the end of  the nineteenth century,5 paves the way 
for Heidegger to address temporality as defining the lived character of  human 
existence, and thereby to develop a hermeneutics of that experience that seeks 
preliminary guidance from the recesses of  Dasein's preontological understand- 
ing of being. 6 Only by showing how the cognitive formation of the categories 
through schematism arises from a temporality that is first experienced 
prethematically in the lived guise of Verstehen can Heidegger develop a common 
vocabulary to initiate a dialogue with Kant.7 My aim here is to demonstrate how 
this implicit need to develop such a vocabulary leads Heidegger in his 1925-e6 
lecture course into a rather abrupt encounter with transcendental philosophy, 
and that it is precisely this development which is presupposed as the dramatic 
breakthrough witnessed in the Kant book. 
My discussion proceeds in three stages. First, I will consider the move 
which defines Heidegger's attempt to recover a deeper sense of logic and 
determines how Kant's treatment of such matters as judgment,  the categories, 
and truth becomes essential to this transition. Second, I will establish how the 
gradual retraction of  the barriers separating Heidegger's thought from Kant's 
allows logic to become a passageway to ontology. Third, I will show how the 
method which Heidegger later practiced in the lecture course comprising The 
Basic Problems of Phenomenology--the method of  reduction, construction, and 
destruction--indicates stages in assembling the horizon for the radical reinter- 
pretation of transcendental philosophy consummated in the Kant book. s 
1. T H E  B R O A D E R  D E T E R M I N A T I O N  OF THE " T R A N S C E N D E N T A L "  
With the recent acknowledgment that the direction of Heidegger's questioning 
was already determined before Being and Time, a perennial concern requires 
attention once again: How truly "Kantian" is that work?9 This query resounds 
with many connotations as to the "transcendental" character of  that investiga- 
tion into the conditions for the possibility of understanding being; indeed, 
s Kisiel, "Why the First Draft," 1~-14. 
6 Cf. Rudolf A. Makkreel, "The Genesis of Heidegger's Phenomenological Hermeneutics and 
the Rediscovered 'Aristotle Introduction' of 19~2," Man and Wor/d 23 (199o): 3o6-3o7, 311,316. 
7 Ibid, 316. Also see GA 56/57:123ff. Of special importance are Heidegger's allusions to Lask 
and Dilthey, as prefiguring the concern for the structural formation of meaning, or its genesis, in 
relation to history and culture. 
s Heidegger, D/e Grundprobleme der Ph~nomenologie, GA 24: 25- 31 ; The Basic Problems of Phe- 
nomeno/ogy, tr. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 198~), t9-93. 
9 Cf. Charles M. Sherover, "Heidegger's Use of Kant in Being and Time," in Kant and Phenorae- 
no/ogy, ed. Joseph Kockelmans and Thomas Seebohm (Washington D.C.: University Press of 
America, 1986). 
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some scholars believe that the puri ty o f  Heidegger 's  earlier phenomenology  
may have been cor rup ted  by his subsequent  allegiance to transcendental  phi- 
losophy.'o In momentar i ly  waiving any evaluations, we need to ask how exclu- 
sively Kantian is Heidegger ' s  employment  o f  the "transcendental";  may it not  
be the case that he seeks a b roade r  determinat ion o f  it which resonates as much 
with Greek  phi losophy beginning with Aristotle as with German  idealism? 
In propos ing  a new point  o f  depar tu re  for  ontology, Heidegger  identifies 
that task as one  which is sdent if ic ."  For  him, science is not to be taken in a 
narrowly m o d e r n  way, but  more  broadly as refer r ing  to an unders tanding  
that recovers on a more  universal plane the meanings already housed within 
the immediacy o f  factical experience.  Ontology then seeks to delimit this 
unders tanding;  by tracing its own evolution f rom a pre-ontological grasp o f  
being, ontological inquiry seeks a pr imordial  form of  articulation or  discourse, 
a/ogos which gathers together  all manifold senses of  "being" by nur tu r ing  
them within the folds o f  a d e e p e r  disclosure. Taking Brentano 's  reading o f  
Aristotle as his point  o f  depar tu re ,  Heidegger  views the categories less as 
linguistic s tructures and more  as delimiting basic ways in which beings reveal 
themselves., ,  His approach  proves unique by showing how time yields the 
avenue for  such revealing or  disclosure and thereby assumes a "constitutive" 
role in interweaving the various senses o f  being. Tempora l i ty  (Teraporalit~t) 
provides the inclusive pat tern,  what he calls the "upon which" (worau/hin), for  
being's comprehens ion  and subsequent  expression in discourse. 
Seen in this light, the t ranscendental  entails a concern not  simply for  
defining being, but  ra the r  for  what facilitates any move towards its determina-  
tion, or  brings it for th  for  disclosure; there  is an implicit sense o f  going 
beyond,  or  " t ranscendence,"  a p h e n o m e n o n  which Heidegger  will f requent ly  
describe in its existential d e m e a n o r  as defining Dasein or  as comprising being- 
in-the-world as such.,s Appropriately,  at the close o f  the second introduct ion 
to Being and Time, Heidegger  describes "phenomenological  t ru th"  (the dis- 
1~ van Buren, "The Young Heidegger and Phenomenology," Man and Wor/d ~3 (1990): 
261-63; and "The Young Heidegger: Rumor of a Hidden King (1919-19~6)," Philosophy Today 
33 (Spring 1989): 1o 4. Also see Theodore Kisiel, "The Missing Link in the Early Heidegger's 
Thought," in Hermeneut/r Phenomeno/ogy, ed. Joseph Kockelmans (Washington D.C.: University 
Press of America, ! 988), 15 ft. 
I~GA 24: 15; tr. 11. 
'" For Heidegger's earliest treatment of the problem of predication, see Frfd~ Schriften, GA l: 
l~lff. As far back as his earliest investigation, Neuere Forschungen fd~r Logik (191~), Heidegger 
had envisioned the problem of discerning the categorial formation of meaning as developed by 
Emil Lask and others of the neo-Kantian school, as well as the impfications that a reinterpretation 
of Kant's transcendental philosophy held for understanding logic more primordially (e.g., GA 1: 
32ff.). 
~s Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes, in Wegsmrhen, GA 9; The Essence of Reason, tr. Terrence 
Malick (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 41. 
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closedness of  being) as "ver/tas transcendentalis," with the prefatory remark that 
"every disclosure of  being as transcendens is transcendental knowledge.'14 
Heidegger's allusion to the transcendental as what lies "higher" entails his 
own radical way of  distinguishing being from beings. Yet even here there is 
already a faint hint of  adopting a traditional problematic, of  recalling in a new 
way the medieval connection between being and truth, as suggested by his 
employment of  the Latin term ver/tas. What distinguishes Heidegger's ap- 
proach, however, is that he begins by conceding an initial perplexity about the 
meaning of  being, and hence begins from a recognition that what is concealed 
in the traditional ontological formulation is also essential to being's disclosure. 
For example, the attempt to extend the inquiry toward what is most universal 
hinges on confronting the opposite problem that 'being' can just as easily be 
construed as the vaguest, most indeterminate concept.l~ To mark the juncture 
where his own inquiry turns in a direction opposite to the tradition, Heidegger 
states, in the same passage as quoted above: "Being, as the basic theme of 
philosophy, is no class or genus of  beings; yet it pertains to every being. Its 
'universality' is to be sought higher up. ''~6 
Heidegger's rendering of  his approach to the study of  being in the second 
introduction to his magnum opua remains somewhat dense because it assumes 
that ontology encapsulates the problems inherited from logic. Or more pre- 
cisely, he begins from a questioning which already seeks to break down and 
reassemble the traditional concerns of  language and truth, whose consumma- 
tion lies far ahead of  even those basic clues that have been gathered from the 
earlier lectures. This is an important point if we are to weigh seriously the 
criticism advanced by Rudolf Makkreel, for one, in maintaining that in his 
interpretation of  Kant Heidegger seeks a too close alignment between the 
temporality defining human existence as care and that found in schematism 
and imagination within the domain of  knowing.~7 
The gradual ascent of  Heidegger's inquiry toward an apex, toward reclaim- 
ing the "transcendental," entails not only'redefining the nature of  traditional 
logic, but also relocating its most seminal concerns within the question of  
being. By providing this new landscape for ontology, Heidegger is able to 1) 
determine exactly how a concern for logic remains despite the overthrow of 
~4Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, GA 2: 51; Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 196~), 6~. 
' s G A  9: 4 - 5 ;  tr. 2 2 - 2 3 .  
~SGA 2: 51; tr. 62. 
~ Rudolf A. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation in Kant (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 199o), ao-e 5. In another context, Makkreel suggests that Heidegger expanded 
the Kantian notion of the transcendental beyond its closer alignment with the constitution of 
knowledge via pure apperception. See "The Genesis of Heidegger's Phenomenological Herme- 
neutics," 316. 
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metaphysics and 2) establish the commonality between apparently diverse 
approaches to such important topics as (the status of) the categories in such 
thinkers as Aristotle and Kant. 's Insofar as his questioning spans an interval 
joining these two seminal figures, Heidegger retracts the barriers which sepa- 
rate his own thought from Kant's and thereby sets the stage for showing how 
the latter's grasp of  the transcendental prefigures his own rendering of  tran- 
scendence as the site of  truth as disclosedness. 
For Heidegger, the transcendental does not simply involve a modern con- 
cern for the possibility of  knowledge, or the emergence of  an object in confor- 
mity with the constitution of  the knowing subject, as suggested in Kant's 
statement of  the Copernican Revolution. Even in his 1925 analysis of  Husserl's 
notion of  categorial intuition, Heidegger separates the sense of  the transcen- 
dental from a simple tie to subjectivity and the issue of  knowledge coupled 
with it.,9 Instead, the transcendental entails attending to the manifestation 
and presencing of  something, the determination of  its being, precisely insofar 
as that disclosive process can be distinguished from what is present. The 
process of  manifestation, which is distinct from beings but nevertheless cou- 
pled with them, becomes the primary theme of phenomenology. But while his 
inspiration may be drawn initially from Kant, Heidegger quickly reinserts the 
concern for the transcendental back into the ancient Greek context prepared 
by Aristotle. The questioning of  being from out of  this context shows that the 
transcendental resides in revealing what makes beings be and hence in an 
attentiveness to that which first permits this disclosure and coordinates it with 
our understanding. 
In this manner, ontology subordinates a concern for defining the constitu- 
tion of  beings even on the most universal plane, seeking a higher level of  
universality which brings into question the arc or horizon for any mani- 
festness, i.e., the possibility of  understanding being. In a unique manner, 
Heidegger succeeds in interweaving Aristotle and Kant together, preserving a 
perennial concern for the essential constitution of  beings and transforming 
the cognitive emphasis on how beings can appear in relation to the conditions 
determining our  own existence. 
Heidegger's strange pairing of  Kant and Aristotle comes to light in a 
passage from Being and Time, which later will form the heart of  his radical 
reinterpretation of  the first Critique: "If what the term 'idealism' says, amounts 
to the understanding that being can never be explained by entities but is 
already that which is 'transcendental' for every entity, then idealism affords 
'scf. Heidegger's discussion ofph~nomenologischerKri~ in GA 56/57: 1~5--1~6. 
~9 Heidegger, Prdegomena zur Ge.~h/chte des Ze/tbegr/~, GA 20: 1o2; History of the Comept of 
T/me, tr. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 174. 
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the only correct possibility for a philosophical problematic. If  so, AristoOe was 
no less an idealist than Kant. TM This statement should be taken not so much as 
Heidegger's defense of idealism as a downplaying of the subjectivistic bias 
often attributed to transcendental philosophy. In an innocuous fashion, 
Heidegger sets the stage for defining the Kantian view of truth, as set forth in 
his celebrated Copernican Revolution. Rather than seeing that dramatic shift 
as marking an attempt to seek a new ground for the appearance of things in 
the constitution of subjectivity, Heidegger construes the Copernican Revolu- 
tion as accenting the priority of our understanding of being in governing our 
comportment toward beings. "Apparentness of  beings (ontic truth) revolves 
around the unveiledness of the constitution of the being of beings (ontological 
truth); at no time, however, can ontic knowledge itself conform 'to' the objects 
because, without the ontological, it cannot even have a possible 'to what'. "'~ 
Heidegger wants to consider the dynamics in the emergence of beings, yet 
in a way which gives attention to how that self-showing can provoke a question 
in us and be disclosed to our understanding. As suggested in his formulation 
of phenomenology, the concern for what shows itself in the most direct way 
possible also entails a reciprocal regard for the "letting be seen," the logos or 
the discursive character of that process. 2~ Written into ontological inquiry is a 
latent concern for the pattern of articulation, the matrix of intelligibility, by 
which being cart enter the forefront of Dasein's understanding. While related 
to a disclosive process, the mode of discursivity is also a key ingredient of it. 
From Heidegger's perspective, the primary difficulty throughout the history 
of philosophy lies in the fact that discourse becomes separated from the 
disclosive process, thereby leading to the truncation of discourse in the guise 
of  the assertion. By the same token, truth is no longer to be found within the 
movement of  unconcealment (a/ethe/a), but instead is displaced into the nar- 
row confines of judgment  or assertion.'s 
The concern for the original locus of truth then becomes the leading edge in 
Heidegger's earlier examination of the problem of logic in his 1996 lectures. 
The issue becomes particularly complex, however, insofar as the very thrust of  
his phenomenology lies in showing how being rises forth into intelligibility, or 
becomes available to discourse, beyond the narrow confines of the proposition. 
9 ~  9 :  975; tr. 95x. 
"GA 3: 13--14; tr. 8- 9. 
"GA 91: 313. 
9 s It is important to keep in mind that Heidegger studied the structure of predication from 
19t9 up through and beyond his dissertation on Duns Scotus in 1996. See Heidegger's allusion to 
Emil Lask, to whom he looked to coordinate his early investigation into logic with the problem of the 
meaning-giving event of factical experience, in the Vorwort ofD/e Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des 
Dun~Scotus, GA t: 191. 
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How this can occur remains difficult to see; for the very concern for the "mean- 
ing" of  being suggests a way of"letting it be seen," of  indicating the parameters 
of  interpretation with the locution "as" or letting what shows itself be seen "as 
something." As Heidegger begins to recognize both in the Log/k and in Being 
and Time, it is necessary to distinguish between the "as" of  assertion and the 
"hermeneutical as.",4 Ultimately, he traces the concrete, factual origin of  that 
difference to the development of  Dasein's understanding and to its situatedness 
in the world. According to Heidegger, Kant, by appealing to human finitude, 
brings knowledge into a broader spectrum so as to rediscover its origin within 
the broader compass of  Dasein's preliminary understanding of  being (des 
vorg~ngigen Seim'verst~ndnis). In this way, Heidegger can appeal to the projec- 
tive structure of  understanding to illuminate the dynamism otherwise hidden 
within the occurrence of  synthetic a priori knowledge. 
With his Copernican Revolution, however, Kant captured the definitive 
characteristics of  our comportment toward beings without the capacity to 
explore its factical occurrence in human existence. He thereby remained un- 
able to make the correlation that Heidegger does between the anticipatory 
character of  the a priori and and the projective structure of  understanding 
(Verstehen) as a "determination of  ex-istence."5 Due to his confinement to any 
ontology of  the present-at-hand, "Kant did not yet see the essence and the task 
of  a pure phenomenological interpretation of  Dasein in the sense of  a funda- 
mental ontological explication of  its basic structure. "*s 
The key move that defines Heidegger's retrieval of  transcendental philoso- 
phy, then, lies in recasting the problem of synthetic a priori knowledge as one 
of  transcendence. But the significance of  this move as implemented in the 
Kant book does not become explicit until we appreciate the earlier develop- 
ment whereby the phenomenological analysis of  human existence allows for a 
broader recovery Of understanding. Only then can Heidegger seek, in the 
common concern for human finltude that he shares with Kant, the prospect of  
discovering in time the horizon for understanding being. The temporal forma- 
tion of  this horizon entails transcendence. But now transcendence is no longe r  
to be taken as a move beyond the confined sphere of  subjectivity to something 
exterior. Rather, transcendence entails the trajectory of  Dasein's entrance into 
the "there," as being-in-the-world. Only by exploring this more  fundamental 
form of  transcendence can Heidegger purify the "transcendental" of  its con- 
tamination with a subject-object split in the Kantian sense and thereby, as seen 
earlier, conceive of  it ontologically as including the questioning of  being found 
~C_,A 2: 91o; tr. 2Ol. 
9 sGA 24: 389; tr. 275. 
9 6GA 25: 318. 
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in a thinker like Aristotle. By showing how Kant's treatment of synthetic a 
priori knowledge can be purged of its ambiguous tie to the "transcendental" 
defined narrowly, Heidegger can employ the Copernican Revolution as the 
key to addressing the possibility of understanding being. 
We thereby open up a space of questioning by which to draw upon what we 
already understand about ourselves and uphold a broader arc for determining 
meaning, a space of  interpretation, that allows something to be determined as 
something beyond the narrow fixity of the assertion. In terms of the larger 
inquiry into the meaning of being, the status of  the "as" becomes relevant in 
asking how to delineate the relation between being and what fosters its disclo- 
sure, namely, dme. The whole question of"being and dme" is an investigation 
into the connective "and" linking them together, and into the formation of the 
concept unifying the manifold senses of being; in rising into intelligibility being 
can be grasped "as . . . .  " i.e., as temporality, as emerging, coming into pres- 
ence, as the dynamic advent of  physis. The whole thrust of  reexamining the 
centrality of  logic, of  which an inquiry into the character of  the "transcenden- 
tal" provides the focus, lies in marking the ascent to the apex where the "as" or 
the occurrence oflogos unlocks for understanding, in its ecstatic dimension, the 
hidden affinity between being and time. 
Put more in Heidegger's vocabulary, to determine the meaning of being 
entails isolating time as that "upon which" the projective understanding of the 
former can unfold. Why should this formulation of the problem then trans- 
late into a reexamination of Kant's rendering of the possibility of human 
experience which is oudined in his "transcendental logic"? The answer lies in 
the fact, as Heidegger says in the second introduction to Being and Time, that 
"the first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards 
investigating the dimension of  Temporality or has even let himself be drawn 
hither by the coercion of the phenomena themselves is Kant."'7 Kant's transcen- 
dental logic becomes central by undertaking an investigation into the tradi- 
tional way of  distinguishing the various senses of being, e.g., via categories, 
only to relocate the source of their determination from reason to their tempo- 
ral origin at a prereflective, prepredicative level of  experience. His doctrine of  
schematism, on which Heidegger bases the bulk of his retrieval of  transcenden- 
tal philosophy, provides the novel orientation from which to rediscover the 
roots of  logic within the larger inquiry into being. 
Heidegger's reexamination of  schematism, then, will be tantamount to out- 
lining the contours of  ecstatic temporality. In this way his repetition of transcen- 
dental philosophy enters the open expanse within which the "hermeneutical as" 
can evoke the determinateness of being and thereby satisfy a more original 
9 T G A  2: 31 ;  t r .  45 .  
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requirement for uncovering what traditionally has been intimated by the word 
'being' grasped as permanent  presence (ous/a). In this respect, the "as" suspends 
the attention directed toward being in view of  what yields the unique avenue for 
its disclosure, i.e., it establishes within discourse itself the import of  the connec- 
tive "and" through which being's own linkage to its condition for unconceal- 
ment, that is, time, can unfold simultaneously. The "hermeneutical as" of Being 
and Time comes to fruition in allowing the force of  the "and" to hold sway in 
discourse before the inevitable identification of two different terms, being in 
relation to dine. 
In reexamining the discursivity inherent in the disclosure of being, we are 
naturally led to address the relevance of logic. Only recendy has it become 
evident how central the issue of logic is for Heidegger, and from our vantage 
point, how his exchange with Kant must inevitably traverse this traditional 
territory.,8 Let us consider more specifically the steps Heidegger takes to 
prepare for his radical reinterpretation of transcendental philosophy, and the 
tactics he employs (more or less presupposed in the Kant book) for removing 
the barriers between his own thought and Kant's. 
2.  T H E  P R E P R E D I C A T I V E  ROOTS OF T H O U G H T  
However the landscape may appear from the vantage point of Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysic.s, Heidegger must traverse a longer path in balancing his 
own preobjective vision of  understanding (Verstehen) with Kant's more objec- 
tively oriented version of the same, namely, Verstand--the employment of its 
pure conceptsmin order  to arrive at the problem of temporality underlying 
them both.,9 The need to trace this development becomes particularly impor- 
tant in light of  a criticism which Cassirer advanced against Heidegger, first in 
the seminar at Davos in i999s~ and subsequently in his review of the Kant 
book in 193o.3 ~ Cassirer questioned Heidegger's apparently abrupt transla- 
tion of  Kant's analyses of  synthetic a priori knowledge into the ontological 
issue of  transcendence, without first exploring what is unique about his pro- 
posal of  a transcendental logic. In retrospect Cassirer's criticism, along with 
,s Cf. van Buren, "The Young Heidegger and Phenomenology," 26off. 
,9 For an interesting discussion of  how Heidegger distinguishes Verstehen from Verstand, see 
John  Sallis, Echoes: After Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 199o), 147-52. Sallis 
suggests that not only is it necessary to "sacrifice" the rationalistic focus of  Verstand, but even the 
more concrete employment of Veraehen must undergo development in order to be recovered 
through its affinity with the disclosure of being itself 044-45) -  
so GA 3: 274-96;  tr. 171--8 5. ~ my review of Taft 's translation of the Kant book in lnter/rreta- 
tion: A Journal of Politic.al Philosophy 19 (1991): I 1 t - I  4. 
s, Ernst Cassirer, "Remarks on Martin Heidegger's Interpretation," in Kant: Disputed Que~- 
t/mu, ed. Moltke S. Gram (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1967), 15o. 
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Makkreel's more recently, suggests the need to reconsider Heidegger's start- 
ing point for his reinterpretation of Kant and to identify the importance of  
logic in marking the differences between these two thinkers. 
Indeed, we state the difference between Heidegger and Kant too simply by 
emphasizing the latter's epistemic concerns. We have seen that Heidegger's 
primary aim is to uncover temporality as the unifying dimension in the mani- 
fold senses of  being, thereby restoring to it its dynamic character as self- 
emerging presence (physis). By contrast, with his interest in determining the 
being of beings within the framework of natural science, Kant adopts a more 
truncated vision of beings whose appearance is confined to externally related 
objects present-at-hand (die Natur). Heidegger's aim is not simply to explore 
the underpinnings of  knowledge so as to divert Kant's entire problematic 
from its enclosure within this restricted horizon. By showing that the catego- 
ries can only address what the object can reveal to us through its appearance, 
Heidegger traces the origin of the categories to the prepredicative occurrence 
of meaning. In this way, the employment of the categories and the synthesis 
which they define contribute to the understanding of being and qualify them 
as "ontological predicates."s' 
In his famous manner, Kant raises the question "How are synthetic a priori 
judgments possible?" He assumes that the understanding of being entailed in 
any cognitive comportment toward beings must be articulated in the form of a 
judgment  or proposition, which becomes the "bearer" of truth. Yet, seen from 
the vantage point of  Greek thought, the concern for judgment  as a way of 
linking subject and predicate entails a prior affinity with the logos as a way of 
"binding" (Verbindung) or as a place of"gathering together."ss The prospect of  
returning to the concealed origin of Greek thought becomes even more signifi- 
cant given the fact that the entire emphasis of  Kant's problem lies in consider- 
ing the adjacent cognitive relation to the object which governs the linkage of 
subject and predicate. In cognition, it is a synthes/s which introduces the dimen- 
sion of  "truth" into the proposition. 
The need for such a synthesis--which for Kant entails the explicit applica- 
tion of the discursive side of a judgment,  of  the unity specified by the cate- 
gory, to the other, perceptual side, as given through intuition--reinforces the 
dependence that judgment  has upon the Greek sense of logos as a gathering 
together. As Heidegger delineates in the Phiinonwnologische Interpretation yon 
Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunf~ and in a more celebrated way later in What Is a 
3, G A  3: 55; tr. 37. 
s s G A  21:325 . 
Heidegger, Phdnomenologische Interpretation yon Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, GA 25: 298- 
3o0, 327 ft. 
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Thing?s5 the key to a synthetic judgment  lies in the fact that the linkage of  
subject and predicate requires a detour to the "place" of the object; that is, 
only insofar as knowledge reaches out or extends toward what is "other," or 
altogether different, can the connection between subject and predicate which 
"adds something new" be successfully made. In order for a (synthetic)judg- 
ment to fulfill the conditions of  truth, it must presuppose a more basic level of  
manifestness. For Heidegger, such a disclosure first becomes explicit in the act 
of  transcendence. 
Due to his linking Kant and Aristode, Heidegger's aim to redefine the 
"transcendental" entails more than appealing to an adjacent discourse purged 
of  all epistemic references so as to translate Kantian motifs into corresponding 
existendal-hermeneutic ones. A more original movement is required in order 
that we may transpose the key concerns of  Kant's thought, e.g., dme and 
finitude, into the context opened up by his own analysis of  being-in-the-world. 
The direction Heidegger follows first becomes evident in his strategy for recast- 
ing Kant's famous "deduction" of  the categories. Kant had envisioned the task 
of"deducing" the categories as involving a justification of  their applicability to 
objects (in a juridical sense).se Yet in the lectures comprising the Logik, 
Heidegger had already diverged from the more commonplace rendering of  
Kant's concern. Heidegger rediscovers the categories as first comprising an 
understanding of  being and then only secondarily as denoting definitive fea- 
tures of  beings and of  the objectivity determining our knowledge of  them.37 
Perhaps in the figure of  Aristotle, to whom Kant looked to derive the pure 
concepts of  the understanding from the table of  judgments, we can find an 
"intermediary" position.s 8 Going back to Aristode, the categories traditionally 
have assumed the role of  distinguishing the constitution of  beings (seiendes a/.* 
seiendes), and thereby have served as "ontological predicates."s0 "These concepts 
are the detetwtinafign of the constitution of the being of beings, and are the theme of  
ont0/ogy."4o Yet, the entire thrust of  modern philosophy beginning with Des- 
cartes, of  which Kant is an heir, has been to suspend the explicidy ontological 
concern in favor of  a reciprocal inquiry into the knowing subject. Or at least 
the ontological question becomes interwoven more deeply with a concern for 
ss Heidegger, D/e Frage nach der D/ng, GA 41: s63-68; What Is a Thing? tr. W. B. Barton and 
Vera Deutsch (Henry Regnery Company, 1967), 161--65. Also see Heidegger's final essay on 
transcendental philosophy 0960, "Kants' These 0her des Seins.," in Wegmarken, GA 9:45 ~ 
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 
A84/B  II 7. 
sTGA 21:375 ft. 
~GA 4a: 43-48; tr. 44-49. 
riGA 95: 995. 
4~ 95: ~95- 
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securing a transparent foundation for truth which resides in a reflective aware- 
ness of  the subject to itself. 
According to Heidegger, there is a regard for "deducing" and "legitimiz- 
ing" the use of  the categories because that task involves questioning the reli- 
ance of  their predicative employment upon an equal partnership formed with 
the opposite stem of  knowledge, namely, the receptivity of  intuition. The need 
to trace this retreat to an intuitive level provides Heidegger with the clue to 
correlate the a priori conditions of  experience with the prereflective "open- 
ness" essential to his own version of  truth.4~ The categories can assume their 
commanding role in designating the constitution of beings only because, in 
accord with the conditions set down by intuition, these predicates help to chart 
"in advance" the very avenue of  accessibility to those beings for afinite knower.4i 
The issue of  the "deduction," then, is really a way of asking how the employ- 
ment of  the categories as presupposing logos can be brought in concert with a 
reciprocal concern for the manifestness of beings. 
Since Kant initially determined this manifestness or pathway of accessibil- 
ity to beings via the conditions of  receptivity, the deduction of  the categories 
amounts to showing how the unity specified through them can simultaneously 
assemble the otherwise diffuse manifold of  sense given in intuition. Only 
through this assembling can the sense manifold be referred to the standard of  
orderliness and universality that constitutes a "concept of  an object."43 Accord- 
ing to Heidegger, the categories acquire their content and their power to refer 
to an object precisely insofar as they call us back to and help to evoke the 
prepredicative form of manifestness, an advance orientation to what can ap- 
pear, which guides the knowing act. By assembling the manifold of  sense as a 
pure synthesis, the categories then direct knowledge from a prior openness 
solicited in advance which anticipates the form of objectivity itself. 
Thus, Heidegger takes the first step toward retracting the barrier separat- 
ing his own thought from Kant's; for Heidegger shows how the attempt to 
resolve the enigma of synthetic a priori knowledge raises concerns about the 
provisional conditions governing our  relations to things which cannot be re- 
solved within the ontology of  the present-at-hand that Kant inherited. The a 
priori conditions of  knowledge which Kant delineates are not then removed 
from experience as some static, eternal structures, but instead originate from 
the disclosive process of  human existence which defines our factical comport- 
ment toward beings.~4 Accordingly, the determination of  an a priori synthesis 
4, G A  9 t : 343- 
4, G A  25: 995ff-  
4s Critique of Pure Reason, A l o  5. 
~ G A  2 t :  414.  
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and the transcendental unity of  apperception in which it is anchored do not 
exhibit an atemporal character; they instead display a hidden affinity with the 
temporal enactment of  human existence.45 
It becomes crucial for Heidegger to form a link between his own view of  
time and Kant's, insofar as temporality makes possible the primary structure 
of understanding,  namely, projection. Insofar as through his Copernican 
Revolution Kant was able to discover the inner possibility of an object in 
antecedent conditions of human finitude, Heidegger believes that this innova- 
tion is an at tempt to seek the root of  any comportment  toward beings in a 
prior unders tanding of  being. What proves decisive from Heidegger's perspec- 
five, however, is the locution that Kant innocuously adopts to make explicit his 
new orientation to the problem of knowledge opened up by the Copernican 
Revolution. Specifically, the concern for the poss/b///ty of experience, of  how 
the synthetic unity of  the manifold makes poss/b/e any reladon to an object, 
harks back to the projective development of understanding which is originally 
infused with possibilities.46 Residing within this projective structure lies the 
deeper  sense of  the a priori, as enunciated in the "prefix" of what precedes 
and comes before. By marking this latent concern for possibility, Heidegger 
shows that there is a connection between the occurrence of  the a priori synthe- 
sis in pure  understanding (Verstand) and the fore-structure of understanding 
(Verstehen) which governs all of  Dasein's comportment  toward beings. 
According to Heidegger, the dynamic component  of  synthetic a priori 
knowledge takes the form of "anticipation" (Ant/z/pat/on).47 "The possibility of 
such an anticipation of the determination of the object for all ~ a c e ,  the sense and 
the direction of such anticipation is the basil: problem of transcendental/0g/c."4s With 
this statement Heidegger shows that even though it is the temporality govern- 
ing the preunders tanding of being which remains the primary concern, a 
transformation of logic is required to arrive at this ontological problematic. 
The  key to this development lies in discovering how for Kant the need to 
amplify the issue of  temporal finitude entails a reciprocal change in what for 
him, even under  the auspices of  the Copernican Revolution, had marked the 
locus of  truth.  
Put simply, j udgment  can no longer provide that focus; indeed, the root of  
j udgmen t  must  be located in proximity with the logos as concretely embodied 
in those dimensions of  human existence which comprise our being-in-the- 
~ G A  2s: 4ooff.  
4SGA 2: z9~-93;  tr. z84. 
47GA 25: s95. 
~ G A  25: J95- 
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world, as displayed most prominent ly  in accord with the projective s tructure 
o f  understanding.40 In this way the principles describing our  finite knowing 
capacity must  "have the character  o f  hermeneut ic  indication."~ ~ Thus  the "as- 
s t ructure"  o f  j u d g m e n t  proves to be an offshoot  o f t h e  "hermeneut ical  as," in 
such a way as to exhibit the circularity inherent  in understanding.s] "T h e  
saying (Logos) o f  that r epresen ta t ion- - i s  not  intuition, but  a determinate ,  ar- 
ticulated representa t ion  in the way o f  letting something be seen as some- 
thing."s* As Heidegger  establishes, the components  o f  disclosedness, under-  
standing, disposition, and discourse facilitate any predicative comprehens ion  
of  beings. "Interpretation is the mode of enactment [for enacting] the being of discov- 
eredness. Interpretation is the basic form of aU knowing."ss Insofar  as it is an act o f  
in terpreta t ion which makes available the possibilities latent in unders tanding,  
in terpreta t ion constitutes a more  pr imordial  root  for judgment .  
Here in  lies the chief  insight, the transposition in focus, which enables 
Heidegger  to recast the a priori  synthesis as the temporal  problem of  imagina- 
tion and thereby to reconcile his own fundamenta l  ontology with Kant's tran- 
scendental  phi losophy.~ Specifically, in view o f  its prepredicat ive dimension 
or  its h idden  affinity with the fore-s t ructure  of  unders tanding,  j u d g m e n t  
(Urteilskraft) must admit  a t ransformat ion of  its own; that is, to j udge  is to 
de te rmine  the scope o f  meaning so as to delineate the intelligibility o f  what is 
apprehended .  When  anchored  in its existential roots, j u d g m e n t  becomes a 
variety o f  " interpreta t ion."  Thus ,  t h rough  a reexaminat ion o f  the power o f  
judgment ,  He idegger  not  only relocates the origin o f  t ru th  in terms o f  dis- 
closedness, but  he also reinforces his a t tempt  to establish interpretat ion as the 
chief  guardian  o f  "meaning."  Existentially conceived, the act o f  judg ing  puts 
into play the very same dynamics which are integral to interpretat ion.  Thus ,  
one o f  Heidegger ' s  foremost  students,  Han n ah  Arendt ,  makes this remark  
upon 'accentua t ing  the role o f  j u d g m e n t  in Critical philosophy: "In Kant judg-  
49 Cf. Stephen H. Watson, "Heidegger, Rationality, and the Critique of Judgment," Review of 
Metaphysics 41 (March 1988): 49o-91. 
s~ 21: 4xo. 
s~ G A  2 x: 474-75- For Heidegger's later analysis of the circularity of the principles of under- 
standing, see GA 41: 242-46; tr. 242-44. 
s'GA 21: 17o. 
ss GA ao: 369; tr. ~6o. 
54 It is important to recognize that in emphasizing the mediating funcdon of imagination, 
Heidegger has, in terms of the correlative place that judgment occupies for Kant in relation to 
reason and understanding, assigned a more primordial place to the act of judging. However, 
Heidegger neglects to make the implications of this development clear by not carrying out as fully 
as possible an analysis of the Critique ofJndgmera. Cf. Makkreel's Imagination and Interpretation in 
Kam, 2o--25, ]5off. 
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ment emerges as 'a peculiar talent which can be practiced only and cannot be 
taught', much like any interpretive stategy."ss The broader rendering of judg- 
ment beyond that of  cognition, as becomes explicit for the first time in the 
third Cr/t/qu,,# emerges as an important area of study which is not in the least 
exhausted by Heidegger's analyses.57 
Two results that are essential to retrieving transcendental philosophy arise 
from our discussion. First, Heidegger shows how it is possible to transplant an 
apparently epistemic question as to the formation of synthetic judgments onto 
an enriched ontological soil. This prepares the way for his radical reinterpreta- 
tion of  the Copernican Revolution and for the "violent" recasting of the basic 
Kantian motifs in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Second, he shows how 
Kant's reconstruction of  the terrain of traditional logic via the development of  a 
"transcendental logic" presupposes an orientation to a prephilosophical, pre- 
scientific level of  intelligibility. Insofar as this transcendental logic delineates 
the rudimentary concepts of the understanding (Verstand) which are the build- 
ing blocks of knowledge and judgment,  it must relinquish the initial archi- 
tectonic plan taken from traditional logic in favor of a new matrix of meanings 
assembled in the fore-structure of understanding (Verstehen). Heidegger 
thereby seeks in Kant, despite the latter's traditionalist bent, an ally in deposing 
the authority of  traditional logic and in rediscovering in the disclosedness of  
Dasein an alternative locus for truth. 
Only given these preliminary steps can Heidegger proceed more radically 
in the Kant book to overthrow the tyranny of reason in favor of  the tempo- 
ralizing activity of  imagination and to recast synthetic a priori knowledge as 
the problem of  transcendence. The 1925-i9~6 lectures entided Logik: Die 
Frage nach der Wahrheit prepare the way for this development. They provide 
the key step in Heidegger's destructive retrieval of  transcendental philosophy, 
a step which is too easily overlooked in his exchange with Cassirer. That is, in 
reciprocity with the transcendental unity of apperception, time "as the univer- 
sal a priori form" sadsfies the condition for the binding together of  representa- 
tions in ajudgment,~ s and thus implicidy points back to the original formation 
of meaning and discursivity (logos) that is intrinsic to any understanding of 
being.59 In this way, the Log/k shows how Kant's thinking provides a regressive 
ss Hannah  A r e n d t , / x a ~ e ,  on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago: The  
Chicago University Pre~,  1981), 4. 
56 Kant, Critique o f J u d ~ ,  tr. J. H. Bernard (New York: Macmillan Publishers, Inc., 1951 ). 
We will not here discuss the importance of the distinction between reflective and determinate 
judgments,  which Heidegger doe, not address in detail. 
5~ Cf. MakkreeJ, Imagination and l n t e r p r e ~  in Kant, 14off. 
# GA 21: 334-38.  
GA 21: 386-87 . 
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path back to temporality as the self-organizing matrix of  meanings that not 
only unifies Dasein's being as care but also makes possible its intentional 
comportment toward beings. The self-affective character of  time in its affinity 
with the "I think" prefigures the temporal unification of  care. "Temporality is 
the ground of  the possibility of  the structures of  care itself. Anticipation is a 
mode of  time, and in no way does it have a presence in time. Time cannot in 
any way be present-at-hand, nor can it be a determinate kind of  being--but  
instead it is the condition of  the possibility for that, that there is something like 
being (not beings). ''6~ 
Yet, even given the removal of  dissimilarities separating his own thought 
from Kant's, Heidegger continues to clarify how a retrieval of  transcendental 
philosophy provides a positive inroad into the hermeneutical situation govern- 
ing his own thought. This inroad must not only mark the reciprocal implica- 
tion holding between Dasein and the question of  being; on the even more 
concrete level of  facticity it must also keep in check the tendency toward 
forgetting which conceals that circularity and diverts questioning toward an 
indifferent apprehension of  beings as present-at-hand. The need for philoso- 
phy to confront that forgetfulness, and to draw forth from an opposite pole 
what conditions the givenness of  the present, defines Heidegger's task in The 
Basic Problems of Phenomenology. In Chapter I of  the Basic Problems, Heidegger 
undertakes a reexamination of Kant's thesis about being as "position" in order 
to find a new point of  departure for ontology. 
3" R E G R E S S I V E  D E S T R U C T I O N  VS. D E S T R U C T I V E  R E T R I E V A L  
In his discussion of  Kant's thesis about being, Heidegger coordinates Kant's 
insights about the presumptuous attempts of  previous thinkers to prove God's 
existence with a greater appreciation for the development of philosophy as a 
historical task. Heidegger includes in his reappraisal of transcendental philoso- 
phy a concern not only for history, but also for the way that the acquisition of  a 
historical sense determines the course of  philosophical inquiry. What Kant 
fails to see is that the deficiencies of  rational metaphysics which he uncovers 
are embedded more deeply within the tradition, and that any counterproposal 
he makes--the schematism of the categories--proves viable only when trans- 
posed into a broader inquiry aimed at undoing the accumulated confusions of  
Western thought. 
Put simply, Kant's insights are only as provocative as the concerns stimulat- 
ing them. When in the Transcendental Dialectic Kant claims that 'being' qua 
existence cannot be defined as an overt property of  something, he does not 
merely disclaim the attempt by rational metaphysics to adduce God's existence 
eeGA 9t: 410. 
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f rom our  concept o f  it (i.e., as the ens rea2issimum). Rather,  the import  o f  his 
"thesis" is that the object (Gegenstand) can exist and stand apart  f rom our  
concept o f  it, precisely because its appearance occurs  in reciprocity with the 
conditions o f  human  finitude. Requisite to this appearing, as suggested in 
Kant's own account o f  schematism, is the offering of  the area in which the op- 
position o f  the object can take place for a finite being. Kant's transcendental  
logic constitutes an advance precisely because it introduces the correlative 
concern for  t ruth  that is foreclosed to rational metaphysics, and thereby works 
against the adoption o f  a simplistic doctrinal stance. 6~ 
For Heidegger,  Kant's critical approach proves decisive only because it 
can, in line with a more primordial concern for truth, mirror  the even more 
radical kind of  questioning that comprises fundamenta l  ontology. 6" But  in 
order  for ontology to reach this level it must recognize a distinction which 
allows being to be addressed thematically and facilitates its comprehension in 
a discursive way, namely,  the ontological difference. "This distinction is not 
arbitrary; rather,  it is the one by which the theme of  ontology and thus of  
philosophy itself is first o f  all attained. It is a distinction which is first and 
foremost  constitutive for ontology. We call it the onto/og/cal d~fference--the 
differentiat ion between being and beings."~ Heidegger  does not explicitly 
al lude to the ontological difference in Being and Time; yet it is the concern 
raised by it, o f  attaining an original point of  depar ture  for ontology, that leads 
him to establish its inescapability as the central topic governing his exchange 
with transcendental  philosophy. 
In retrospect, Heidegger 's  suggestion that the categories not only must 
have a temporal  affinity,e4 but even more radically have time as their origin, 
brings the deepest stem of  knowledge or imagination more closely in line with 
Dasein's disclosedness. Tho u g h  over a sixty-year span critics have identified 
difficulties with Heidegger 's  account o f  schematism, Heidegger  refrains f rom 
simply substituting metaphysical for epistemic concerns.65 Rather,  as our  em- 
phasis on the 1995-26 lectures o f  the Logik shows, the structure of  synthetic a 
priori knowledge can be revealed in terms of  a deeper  unity that is indicated 
by the components  o f  Dasein's disclosedness. This more fundamenta l  experi- 
ence o f  t ruth  does not  provide a new orientation for metaphysics or  even 
establish its priority, as much as mark the point of  depar ture  f rom which the 
viability o f  its task can l~e brought  into question. Thus,  Heidegger  captures 
s, Cf. Kant's discussion of dogmatism in the first Cr/t/que, B xxxv. 
hGA 94: 93; tr. t 7. 
~GA 24: 93; tr. ] 7. 
e~ Kant, C~lUr of Pwre Reason, A 138/B 177, A 139/B ]78. 
es Cassirer, "Remarks on Martin Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant," 15off. For a somewhat 
different perspective, see Makkreel, Imagination and lntz,~zre~ion in Kant, 25ff. 
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this nuance by employing the phrase "problem of metaphysics" in the title of  
his 192 9 work on Kant. ee Heidegger alerts us to the fact that the previously 
overt regard for metaphysics must now give way to questioning its inner 
possibility.6v 
For Heidegger, the key to charting this new course of  inquiry lies in bring- 
ing the ontological difference into the foreground. Precisely because the ar- 
rival of  a new departure for investigation is underway, it is necessary to reex- 
amine the very character of  the phenomenological method. To this end, 
Heidegger identifies the threefold task of  phenomenology as reduction, con- 
struction, and destruction. 6s Reduction involves the direction of  inquiry lead- 
ing away from beings back to the prior understanding of being. Construction 
entails the thematic unfolding of  that preunderstanding in terms of  the essen- 
tial components of  Dasein's disclosedness. And finally destruction involves 
removing the accumulated confusions of the tradition which stem from a 
neglect for the question of  being and which conceal the origin of  philosophy 
in the ontological difference. For the sake of  clarification, there may be a 
tendency to isolate each of  these moments, for example, to confine the destruc- 
tive phase to Heidegger's historical exchange with Kant. But in another sense 
we can also witness the interplay of  these moments in any interpretation. In 
the ~9a6 lectures, for instance, the redirection of  Kant's thought from out of  
its confinement to an ontology of  the present-at-hand back to an antecedent 
understanding being entails reduction, even though its historical import and 
orientation implies destruction as well. Likewise, the reassembling of  the her- 
meneutical situation which defines Heidegger's project in Being and Time-- 
outlining the horizon for the projective understanding of  beingDinvolves 
construction. But because that development requires the historical retrieval of  
transcendental philosophy, we find the moments of  destruction and reduction 
included also. 
In a certain sense, Heidegger practices destruction throughout the Bas/c 
Problems (x9a7) , insofar as he examines the four historical theses about being, 
beginning with the Kantian version, "being is not a real predicate." Yet, be- 
cause these lectures only prefigure the retrieval of transcendental philosophy 
which reaches its zenith in the Kant book, the initial delineation of  the Kantian 
thesis appears as a specific variation of  what we might more generally describe 
as the task of  destructive retrieval. Insofar as in his account of  the Kantian 
thesis Heidegger does not initially show how transcendental philosophy pro- 
vides a nascent outline for his own project of  fundamental ontology, his analy- 
eSGA 3: xvii; tr. xix. 
~GA 3: 235; tr. 260. 
eeGA 24: 28-32; tr. 21-93,  
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ses assume more of  a "regressive" character. That is, by marking the contours 
of  what has been forgotten, Heidegger indirectly seeks the clues that refer 
back in questioning (R~e~rage) to a more originary point of  departure that 
t-~lls forth an antecedent understanding of  being. In this way the Kantian 
thesis proves decisive; for it retroactively points to omissions which are so 
acute as to require a countermovement of  inquiry culminating in the question 
of  being. 
Kant's thesis that being is not a real predicate occurs within the Transcenden- 
tal Dialectic, which comprises the second half of  transcendental logic. Heideg- 
ger's selection of  the Kantian thesis may at first appear somewhat strange 
except insofar as we recognize his later emphasis on addressing the crisis in 
metaphysics, of  which Kant's examination in the Critique of Pure Reason serves 
notice. Yet, the preliminary step we have taken in examining Heidegger's view 
on logic proves enlightening here. For the very thrust of  Kant's criticism is to 
derail the misemployment of  logic which governs the spurious attempt to prove 
the existence of  God. Reason which is detached from the conditions for the 
manifestness of  beings, and uprooted from human finitude, attributes the 
characteristic of  existence to an ultimate ground. But this ground does not 
admit appearance as an object in accord with any factual conditions, and thus 
reason becomes caught in its overzealous pursuit of  advocating pure presence, 
an illusion of  arriving at the absolute totality of  conditions.~ 
For Heidegger, what is the significance of  Kant's exposing the spurious 
assumption of  rational metaphysics? Kant maintains that being as exhtenve is not 
an attribute analytically contained in a concept but a synthetic determination 
holding between a concept (in this case God) and an object. The synthetic 
characterization of  existence means that it cannot be defined by reason alone on 
a model of  an infinite intellect seeking perfect ontical knowledge. Instead, we 
must refrain from simply identifying the notion of  existence with presence-at- 
hand, as if it were immediately accessible, like some ontical characteristic to be 
singled out by ostension. The sense attributed to being is not to be reached 
ostensively, but only arrived at through a prior assembling of  a horizon in 
conformity with our finitude. Only through the establishment of  something 
like a perceptual continuum in accord with the (pure) sensibilized conditions of  
space and time can we attribute existence, and, through an object's emergence 
within the horizon of  manifestness, identify it ostensively in terms of  the tempo- 
ral dimension of  the present (Gegenwart). 
What is the upshot of  Heidegger's reexamination of the Kantian thesis? We 
find that the attempt to circumscribe 'being' too narrowly within the purview of 
69 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 334 / B 399. For an insightful discussion of  this problem, see 
John Sallis, The Gathering of Reason (Athens: Ohio University Press, 198o), 135ff. 
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presence (Anwese~) leads to its misidentification of what can be present, i.e., a 
being, that is, a blurring of the distinction between being and beings. As such, 
the crisis in (rational) metaphysics which Kant identifies as reason's attempt t o  
outstrip possible experience arises from neglecting the horizon for understand- 
ing being, from failing to heed the ontological difference.7o 
In this way, we discover how Kant's thesis about being, despite its negative 
character, really supplies an important clue to an essential ingredient in the 
understanding of  being, its discursivity. As Heidegger will later state in The 
Metaphysical Foundations of  Logic (1928): "Being is different than beings, and 
only this difference in general, this possibility of  distinction, insures an under- 
standing of  being."7, This insight foreshadows Kant's recognition of  the empti- 
ness of  the concept of  being within rational metaphysics and the difficulties 
surrounding its articulation. In flagging this forgetfulness, this fateful with- 
drawal of  being, Heidegger also uncovers the alternative prospect of  arriving 
at what fosters the understanding of  being, the advent of  its disclosure.7' The 
recognition of  how not to address 'being' becomes relevant within a regressive 
movement whose aim is to reach the otherwise hidden conditions for under- 
standing being, to question what has been excluded in the simple identifica- 
tion of  being with presence, namely, the concern for temporality. 
Seen in this light, "Kant's thesis about being" displays a curious obliqueness 
which conceals the role time is given in defning our understanding of  being. 
But this obliqueness only points out the tenacity which the neglect for temporal- 
ity has had in distorting ontological inquiry, and, by implication, the urgency 
of  counteracting that neglect by executing the kind of  retrieval which Heideg- 
ger proposes. Kant's thesis, then, turns out to be "about being" precisely 
because it diverts our  attention from it, directing our view not toward being 
initially, but toward what was withheld from consideration conjointly with it, 
namely, time. The obliqueness of  Kant's allusion to being becomes an invita- 
tion to follow the entire transposition in his ontological problematic, to recall 
that disproportion and rupture which gives attention not to being, much less 
only to time, but to the reciprocity between them. 
With this regressive move, Heidegger anticipates the decisive concern 
which governs his analyses in the Kant book, namely, addressing the connective 
Frank Schalow, "Re-Opening the Issue of World: Heidegger and Kant," in Man and World 
2 o  0 9 8 7 ) :  2 o o .  
~' Heidegger, Metaphysische Anfangsgr~nde der Logik im Ausgang yon Leibniz, GA 26: 193; The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, tr. Michael Helm (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 
152 9 
7" For a later attempt to think the basis of this understanding of being, see Heidegger's 1936 
lectures Beitriig.e zur Philosophic (Vom Ereignis), GA 65: 455- For an attempt to defend Heidegger's 
strategy for thinking the "unthought" origin of metaphysics, cf. Steven Croweil, "Texts and 
Technology," Man and Worm 23 (October t99o): 433, 437. 
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"and" that joins being with time. Through his analysis of schematism, he estab- 
lishes that time is not simply an extension of the present, but includes the 
formation of  the other ecstases, of  future and past. In this way it becomes 
possible to offset the traditional view of being as permanent presence and 
question back to the formation of  that horizon which first grants the possibility 
of  understanding being. Thus, destruction and reduction blend together with 
construction to mark the crucial juncture where Heidegger can extend his 
inquiry, that is, by eliciting the "upon-which" for the projective understanding 
of being. For Heidegger, the temporal character of  schematism ceases to be 
merely a variation of  the temporal series involved in outlining the sequence of  
natural events. Instead, temporality determines the ecstatic formation of  self- 
hood, as embodying finite transcendence, and thereby exhibits the same animat- 
ing quality of  historical life that Heidegger (with an eye to Dilthey) believed 
determined the movement of authentic questioning. As Heidegger acknowl- 
edges, Kant's thought is properly called transcendental philosophy because in 
the richest sense it is rooted in the problem of transcendence (temporality).Ts 
We will not consider any further this later development of  Heidegger's 
appropriation of Kant's thought, the heart of his destructive retrieval of  tran- 
scendental philosophy.~4 From our standpoint, what becomes important are 
Heidegger's remarks at the end of  the Basic Problems, which refer back to his 
observations at the beginning of  Being and Time. Specifically, in contrast to the 
positive sciences, Heidegger states that ontology is a "Temporal science."75 Fur- 
ther, he states that "all propositions of  ontology are Temporal Propositions" and 
that these "have the character of  Temporal t ~ h ,  ver/tas temporal/s."76 The latter 
remarks become particularly telling in light of his suggestion in Being and Time 
that phenomenology is an exercise in "transcendental truth." 
The preparatory stages in Heidegger's dialogue with Kant lead us to the 
threshold where the traditional task of  metaphysics and the discourse defining 
it are redirected from another beginning. What does Heidegger then mean by 
the "problem of  metaphysics" in the title of his work, a query which he will 
later voice in What Is a Thing?~ Given our preceding discussion, he has in view 
7SGA 24: 423; tr. 298. 
74 It is important to keep in mind Heidegger's emphasis in the late Marburg period on 
bringing about a transformation within ontology itself; he refers to the development of 
"metontology" that redirects the inquiry into the possibility of understanding being toward the 
more direct relevation of beings themselves that first provokes in us the question ~"ny? ~ Cf. GA 
26: 199-2o2; tr. ~57-58. Also see John Sallis's account of how the development of metontoiogy 
involves renouncing the "claim of V~rs/and" in favor of a disclosure that fosters the emergence of 
beings; Echoes: Afler Heidegg~r, 149. 
~sGA 24: 460; tr. 323. 
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juxtaposing and holding in a tension the traditional issues o f  metaphysics, 
though within a discourse or discursivity that moves in an opposite direction 
to the conventional formulations. The bearing of this tension defines the new 
task reserved to phenomenology. Being and Time is not just a Kantian enter- 
prise because it takes over similar terminology. Rather, it proves to be more 
originally Kantian by readapting that vocabulary and redirecting it from an- 
other attunement to the logos, which allows for a deeper preservation and 
appropriation of  Kant's problematic. Through Kant's thought Heidegger can 
then adopt the logical concern of  truth and judgment  first raised in Husser- 
lian phenomenology and bring them into a wider ontological orbit in accord 
with the question of being. As Heidegger states toward the end of the 
Pl~nomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft in 1928: 
"When I began to study Kant's Cr/t/que of Pure Reason again a few years ago 
and read it, as it were, against the background of Husserl's phenomenology, it 
was as if the scales fell from my eyes, and Kant became for me the confirma- 
tion of  the correctness of the way for which I was searching."TS 
With this observation, we reach the end of  our account of the initial stages 
of Heidegger's dialogue with Kant. What we ultimately discover is how outlin- 
ing the topography for asking the question of being, of the original hermeneu- 
tical situation, includes as its intrinsic component the reissuance of ontology 
from a "truly" Kantian beginning. Heidegger's turn to transcendental philoso- 
phy proves to be not so much an anomaly in the development of his phenome- 
nological task as an important step in his attempt to couch traditional logic in a 
more fundamental experience of truth. Accordingly, the unfolding of this 
Kantian beginning will always pose a special challenge and consequently pres- 
ent a special reward for those who wish to persevere in making it. It is one 
which will enable us to open up new vistas, and, even for those who wish to 
downplay the importance of  transcendental philosophy in Heidegger's devel- 
opment, this beginning remains to a large extent inescapable.79 
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